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NOTE
"BURNING THE HOUSE TO ROAST THE PIG":
UNRELATED INDIVIDUALS AND SINGLE
FAMILY ZONING'S BLOOD RELATION
CRITERION
Suburbia has become a national ideal.1 Yet virtually all residential
land in many suburban areas has been zoned for the sole use of the
traditional "single family."'2 This has the effect of excluding a signifi-
cant portion of eligible residents, those who are unrelated but desire
to live together. Zoning ordinances which define the family unit in
terms of the blood relationship among its members3 and correspond-
ingly limit the use of prime residential land to single families' have
I See Roberts, The Demise of Property Law, 57 CoRNELL L. R~v. 1, 20-23 (1971)
for an evaluation of single family zoning in suburbia chronicling the development of
what has become the status quo.
A central feature in this [new] affluence was the single family house situated in
suburbia. The substantive content of television . . .demonstrated a suburban
bias, while the commercial messages deliberately instilled it.... While the media
conditioned the appropriate responses, the federal government contributed its
share by subsidizing expressways leading out into the suburbs, tilting the income
tax in favor of the homeowner, and expediting the availability of mortgage credit.
Id. at 20 (footnotes omitted).
2 See, e.g., Williams & Norman, Exclusionary Land Use Controls: The Case of North-
Eastern New Jersey, 22 SYRAcus. L. Rav. 475 (1971). In a survey taken of the entire state
of New Jersey it has been shown that in Morris, Middlesex, and Monmouth Counties,
99.5% of all residential land is limited to single family use through zoning, thus effectively
creating a suburban exclusionary barrier to urban expansion from New York City. Id.
at 486-87.
Even after limiting the scope of analysis solely to the area of the "family," a broad
range of possible definitions may be found within property case law. See, e.g., G.M.G.
Realty Co. v. Spring, 191 Misc. 334, 336, 77 N.Y.S.2d 732, 734 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1948)
(the "family" consists only of a blood related father, mother, and children); Stafford v.
Village of Sands Point, 200 Misc. 57, 59, 102 N.Y.S.2d 910, 913 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (the "family"
consists of those living together in one house, under the same management, with a common
goal); Boston-Edison Protective Ass'n v. Paulist Fathers, Inc., 306 Mich. 253, 256-57, 10
N.W.2d 847, 848 (1943) (a religious association is a "family"); Oystead v. Shed, 13 Mass.
520, 523 (1816) (boarders and lodgers are a "family"); Marino v. Mayor & Council, 77
N.J. Super. 587, 592-94, 187 A.2d 217, 220-21 (Law Div. 1963) (an unrelated man and
woman living together may be a "family").
a The basic type of zoning ordinance discussed in this Note is one which defines
"family" as "one person living alone, or two or more persons related by blood, marriage,
or legal adoption" or similarly relies on a nexus with blood relation in defining its "R-l"
residential area. Palo Alto, Cal., Munic. Code § 18.04.210, quoted in Palo Alto Tenants
Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908, 909 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
4 Even before the widespread implementation of "public" zoning, the "single family"
was used as a limiting technique in private restrictive covenants. See, e.g., Kalb v. Mayer,
164 App. Div. 577, 150 N.Y.S. 94 (2d Dep't 1914). By the time the Supreme Court first
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solidified the exclusionary makeup of suburban America5 and have
largely precluded the establishment of more pluralistic communities.-
Faced today with a nationwide housing crisis7 and concerned with the
summary and often absolute nature of the exclusion,8 courts have begun
to challenge tradition and to consider the rights and the needs of the
considered the constitutionality of zoning in the landmark case of Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the typical pattern had already evolved:
The entire area of the village is divided by the ordinance into six classes of
use districts, denominated U-1 to U-6, inclusive . . . . U-1 is restricted to single
family dwellings, public parks, water towers and reservoirs, suburban and inter-
urban electric railway passenger stations and rights of way, and farming, non-
commercial greenhouse nurseries and truck gardening ....
Id. at 380.
5 The "single family" is only one of the exclusionary techniques employed. Other
weapons in the arsenal of the exclusion-minded suburban planner include (1) minimum
building size requirements, (2) prohibition of multiple dwellings, (3) restrictions on the
number of bedrooms, (4) prohibition of mobile homes, and (5) lot size or lot width require-
ments. See Williams & Norman, supra note 2, at 481, 484. This list is by no means exhaus-
tive. The widespread use of discretionary devices such as variances and special permits
achieves the same end by promoting high cost development and consequent economic ex-
clusion. See Davidoff & Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary Land Use
Controls, 22 SYRAcusE L. REy. 509, 522 (1971).
Use of these exclusionary devices has largely been accepted by the judiciary. See, e.g.,
Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 478 (1952) (five acre minimum lot
size upheld); Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952),
appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953) (minimum building size held to be a reasonable bulk
regulation). The Supreme Court of New Jersey has recognized, however, that a single
municipality's view of the suburban ideal must be balanced against regional needs.
What may be the most appropriate use of any particular property depends
not only on all the conditions, physical, economic and social, prevailing within
the municipality and its needs, present and reasonably prospective, but also on
the nature of the entire region in which the municipality is located and the use
to which the land in that region has been or may be put most advantageously.
Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 513, 64 A.2d 347, 349-50
(1949).
6 See note 142 and accompanying text infra.
7 One-sixth of America's 66 million housing units are substandard or over-
crowded. Many are dilapidated and lack indoor plumbing. About 7.8 million
families-one in every eight---cannot afford standard housing. Many of them are
backed into city slums, with little hope of escape. In housing racial segregation
remains the norm. It exists in cities large and small, in all parts of the country,
and cuts across all income levels. It persists regardless of local laws and national
policies.
FoRD FOUNDATION, A DECENT PLAcE To Lrvx 3 (1971). See Jackson, Attacking the Affluent
Islands: A Legal Strategy for the 70"s, 1971 URaAx L. ANN. 3.
8 See note 2 supra. Even if a municipality provides areas for uses, such as apartments,
by unrelated people, its R-1 "single family" zone may be more desirable in terms of both
locale and facilities. A dear example of this pattern is found in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), where the prime residential area contained "single family
dwellings, public parks, water towers and reservoirs, [and] suburban and interurban
electric railway and passenger stations and rights of way." Id. at 380.
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"unrelated."9 A developing constitutional analysis of the interests of
excluded unrelated individuals is revealing the flaws in the traditional
single family zoning approach.
I
EFFECTS OF REGULATORY SCHEMES
The multiplicity of criteria historically used to define the "single
family"'10 has contributed to the uncertain scope of suburban residential
exclusion. It is evident, however, that in barring entry by unrelated
individuals into prime residential areas, the "blood relation" element
of single family provisions constitutes the most severe restriction to be
found in zoning ordinances. 1 Although there are variations in legisla-
tive definition, 2 suburban zoning ordinances typically limit their R-1
areas to a single family related by "blood, marriage, or adoption."' 3
9 See Brady v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242 (Ist Dist. 1962);
City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 IM. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966); Kirsch Holding Co.
v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971); Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v.
City of Margate City, 112 N.J. Super. 341, 271 A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1970); Marino v. Mayor
& Council, 77 N.J. Super. 587, 187 A.2d 217 (Law Div. 1963). In invalidating single family
zoning ordinances, each of these cases has considered the problems of unrelated individuals
residing together.
10 In addition to blood relation, the following have been utilized as yardsticks to
determine whether a living group is a "family": duties of support (Jaycox v. Brune, 434
S.W.2d 539, 544 (Mo. 1968)), common goals and objectives (Stafford v. Village of Sands Point,
200 Misc. 57, 59, 102 N.Y.S.2d 910, 913 (Sup. Ct. 1951)), the number of individuals in the
unit (City of Takoma Park v. County Bd. of Appeals, 270 A.2d 772, 775 (Md. 1970)), use
of common housekeeping facilities (Harmon v. City of Peoria, 373 Ill. 594, 601-02, 27
N.E.2d 525, 528-29 (1940)), control by a single head (Kiska v. Skrensky, 145 Conn. 28, 33,
188 A.2d 523, 526 (1958)), and permanence (Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 821 F.
Supp. 908, 911 (NJD. Cal. 1970)).
11 See notes 14-16 and accompanying text infra.
12 In Town of Ithaca v. Lucente, 36 App. Div. 2d 560, 317 N.Y.S.2d 679 (8d Dep't 1971),
the court considered an ordinance which allowed not only the traditional "blood, marriage,
or adoption" family, but also permitted "a group of one or more persons occupying the
premises and living as a single housekeeping unit, as distinguished from a group occupying
a boarding house, rooming house, lodging house, club, fraternity, hotel or motel." Id. at
560-61, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 680-81 (Ithaca, N.Y., Zoning Ordinance). A "single housekeeping
unit" thus emerges as another criterion to be considered. See notes 64, 132 & 186 and
accompanying text infra.
Another type of ordinance leaves the term "family" undefined, thereby ultimately re-
quiring judicial interpretation. Section 22-5 of the zoning regulations of Atherton, Cali-
fornia, exemplifies the vagueness of this approach, defining a "single family dwelling" as
"[a] detached building designed for or occupied exclusively by one family." Brady v.
Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 71, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242, 243 (1st Dist. 1962) (Atherton,
Cal., Ordinance 146, § 22-5).
1 The Palo Alto, California zoning ordinance, considered in Palo Alto Tenants Union
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Critical practical problems exist for individuals or groups falling
outside these definitional boundaries. The zoning obstacles facing un-
related individuals wishing to live under one roof respect no age bar-
riers or social status,14 although their impact is often greater on persons
of limited means.15 To the extent that the housing needs of unrelated
individuals exceed the narrow limits usually tolerated by the municipal
scheme, their choice is often between high density urban life or "il-
legal" residence in the suburbs.16 The "unrelated" are denied not only
suburban homes, but also the concomitant benefits of prime municipal
services and a "greener" life style. The critical issue is whether the
plight of unrelated individuals is sufficiently cognizable as a matter of
constitutional law to mandate alternative planning approaches in the
context of municipal zoning ordinances.
II
THE CONSTITUTIONAL SETrING
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has de-
veloped as the accepted constitutional vehicle for overriding unreason-
able zoning ordinances.17 Consequently, lower courts have consistently
v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970), is typical, with "family" defined as "one
person living alone, or two or more persons related by blood, marriage, or legal adoption,
or a group not exceeding four persons living as a single housekeeping unit." Id. at 909
(Palo Alto, Cal. Munic. Code § 18.04.210).
14 Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971)
recognized the impact of the single family restriction in New Jersey's resort communities
of Belmar and Manasquan:
[rjwo unrelated families of spouses and children cannot share an adequate
cottage or house for the summer, nor could a small unrelated group of widows,
widowers, older spinsters or bachelors-or even of judges. Likewise barred from
seasonal use would be a perfectly respectable group or organization of older per-
sons, unless (under the Belmar ordinance) they were all members of a recognized
religious order.... Moreover, it appears that a violation would occur ... if the
related family unit had house guests.
Id. at 248, 281 A.2d at 517.
15 The aged make up the group perhaps most limited by a single family restriction
since they are often of moderate means and have need for access to the facilities and com-
forts which suburbia can provide. See generally 1971 WHITE HousE CONFERENCE ON AGING,
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES: HOUSING THE ELDERLY.
16 See Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908 (1970); Brady v. Superior
Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1st Dist. 1962); City of Des Plaines v. Trott-
ner, 34 Ill. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966); Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan,
59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971); Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 N.J.
Super. 341, 271 A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1970); Marino v. Mayor & Council, 77 N.J. Super. 587,
187 A.2d 217 (Law Div. 1963). These cases illustrate the possible legal consequences of
situations in which individuals opt for the latter course.
17 This may at least in part be a result of the paucity of Supreme Court guidance on
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avoided expressly basing their zoning decisions on grounds other than
due process.' 8 Yet a marked de facto judicial shift has taken place, with
courts reaching due process holdings grounded in first amendment as-
sociational la or fourteenth amendment equal protection 0 rationales.
Thus, operating in the shadows of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,21 some
courts have tacitly opted for broad consideration of the associational
and egalitarian effects of single family zoning within a due process
framework.
22
the matter. The only two cases in which the Court has directly dealt with zoning are Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), which sustained zoning as a permis-
sible exercise of the police power, and Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928),
which held that there are reasonable limits on the extent of this regulatory power. Both
the challenges to the ordinances and the Court's opinions were framed in terms of due
process. Thus, lower courts have for the last four decades been left to deal with zoning
within this limited framework. A typical judicial evaluation was promulgated by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Schmidt v. Board of Adjustment, 9 N.J. 405, 88 A.2d 607 (1952):
The Fourteenth Amendment in the domain of state action does not operate as a
limitation upon the quantum of the power, reasonably exercised. It merely condi-
tions the exertion of the power by the demands of due process. And the guaranty
of due process requires "only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or
capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation
to the object sought to be attained."
Id. at 414, 88 A.2d at 611 (emphasis in original), quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 US. 502,
525 (1934).
18 See, e.g., the cases cited in note 9 supra, which consider single family blood relation
standards vis-t-vis unrelated individuals from a variety of perspectives. All, with the ex-
ception of the Trottner decision's technical determination of an overextension of
legislative power, explicitly based their decisions on due process.
19 For a discussion of the associational effects of the ordinances, see City of Des Plaines
v. Trottner, 34 Ill. 2d 432, 485, 216 N.E.2d 116, 118 (1966); Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough
of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 251, 253, 281 A.2d 513, 518-19 (1970). The court in Palo Alto
Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970), although sustaining the
validity of the ordinance, at least directly confronted the associational issue in first amend-
ment terms:
The Court thus reaches the merits. Plaintiffs' argument is that the right of
unrelated persons to live together "as a family" in a single dwelling place is an
"emanation" of the freedom of association specifically guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights.
Id. at 910. But the court was not convinced that an infringement of plaintiffs' constitu-
tional right to freedom of association had been demonstrated. Id. at 911.
20 Emphasizing the comparision of permissible and impermissible uses, both the Illi-
nois and New Jersey Supreme Courts have engaged in a rather restrained equal protection
analysis. See City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 Ill. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966); Kirsch
Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971); note 14 supra;
note 81 infra. See generally notes 66-93 and accompanying text infra.
The Pennsylvania cases come closer to applying equal protection to zoning, but even
they, recognizing the lack of precedent, are finally decided in terms of due process. See
Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown
Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); note 77 infra.
21 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
22 E.g., Brady v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242 (Ist Dist. 1962);
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This expansion of constitutional reasoning is quite acceptable
given the breadth of the due process clause. Both equal protection and
freedom of association are intimately related to substantive due pro-
cess. 23 Conceptually, due process is the broadest of the three, allow-
ing for the input of a host of factors centering on fairness considera-
tions with reasonableness as the foundation.24 Recent decisions, exem-
plified by that of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Kirsch Holding
Co. v. Borough of Manasquan,25 have considered the associational and
equal protection rights of unrelated individuals pivotal in holding
single family zoning ordinances unconstitutional.26
A. Single Family Zoning and Freedom of Association
One of the most troublesome aspects of the blood relation criterion
is its infringement upon a number of associational interests arguably
meriting constitutional protection.27 These interests include a broad
range of living arrangements, which, if shown to merit associational
recognition protected by the first amendment, may preclude summary
zoning exclusion without a showing of a compelling state interest.28
Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971); Gabe
Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 NJ. Super. 341, 271 A.2d 430 (App. Div.
1970).
23 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969) (relation between equal pro-
tection and substantive due process); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (equal
protection and due process are not mutually exclusive); cj. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353, 364 (1957) (general relation between due process and first amendment rights).
In his dissent in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947), Justice Black stated
that the fourteenth amendment fully incorporates the first eight amendments and makes
them applicable to the states. Despite the "selective incorporation" approach of the major-
ity of the Supreme Court, time has vindicated Justice Black, with "selective incorporation"
becoming almost total incorporation of the Bill of Rights. See Mykkeltvedt, The judicial
Development of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause-Prelude to the Selective
Incorporation of the Jill of Rights, 22 MERcER L. REv. 533, 533 (1971). The process judi-
cially pursued in zoning is better termed "absorption," with the focus on the implicit input
of associational and equal protection interests. Given the breadth of the due process clause
and its accompanying "reasonableness" criterion (see note 24 and accompanying text infra),
the standards applicable to the first and fourteenth amendments become inherent in due
process, effectuating by a "back door" approach a constitutional theory neglected by prece-
dent.
24 The due process clause has attained independent significance as a "reasonableness
test," and, when coupled with the fifth amendment concept of "liberty," it allows for "vir-
tually unlimited judicial development." Mykkeltvedt, supra note 23, at 554.
25 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971).
26 See, e.g., id. at 248, 281 A.2d at 517.
27 See Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971),
where the New Jersey Supreme Court grappled with overly proscriptive effects of single
family ordinances. See also note 14 supra.
28 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). "[SNtate action which
1972]
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The scope of first amendment associational protection clearly
encompasses political, economic, religious, and cultural groups. 29 Al-
though the Supreme Court has frequently recognized the public expres-
sion of associational rights,3 0 the parameters of private expression are
less clear.81 Notwithstanding the classic Griswold v. Connecticut 2 "pen-
umbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion,"33
there is no doubt that municipal zoning may regulate living conditions
pursuant to the permissible goals of the police power. 4 Whether mu-
nicipal zoning can accomplish this through overly proscriptive blood
relation requirements may be questioned. Although the limits of Gris-
may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny."
Id. at 460-61. Freedom of association may limit the ability of private landowners, as well as
municipal authorities, to restrict the uses of land to the single family. Under Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants may constitute
state action restricting freedom of association in violation of the fourteenth amendment. A
number of courts have refused to enforce unduly restrictive single family private covenants.
See, e.g., Jones v. Smith, 241 F. Supp. 913 (D.V.I. 1965); Neptune Park Ass'n v. Steinberg,
138 Conn. 357, 84 A.2d 687 (1951); Boston-Edison Protective Ass'n v. Paulist Fathers, Inc.,
306 Mich. 253, 10 N.W.2d 847 (1943). See also Kalb v. Mayer, 164 App. Div. 577, 150 N.Y.S.
94 (2d Dep't 1914) (pre-zoning discussion of the parameters of negative reciprocal
covenants).
29 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
30 E.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); United Mine Workers v.
Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia
State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
31 Group activity has been held "undeniably [to] enhance" the "effective advocacy of
both public and private points of view." NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449, 460 (1958). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Justice Douglas,
speaking for the Court in Griswold (id. at 485) cited Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139
(1962) (prisons not within zone of privacy protecting conversations engaged therein be-
tween brothers from electronic eavesdropping); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)
(unreasonable search and seizure under color of state law a cognizable violation of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (city health inspection
not such an unwarranted invasion of privacy as to contravene the fourteenth amendment);
Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (transit radio programs on streetcars
and buses did not invade constitutional right of privacy of passengers); Breard v. Alex-
andria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) ("Green River ordinance" held not violative of first amendment
freedoms but a legitimate exercise of state police power to safeguard the right of privacy);
and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (discriminatory sterilization violates the
equal protection clause), as indicative of the controversy extant in the field of private
associational rights.
82 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
83 Id. at 483.
84 After the Supreme Court's decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926), there could no longer be any doubt that a municipality could zone to
ensure the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. Moreover, the living conditions
of all suburban groups, including the traditional family, are regulated by a statutory
matrix composed of building and housing codes, bulk regulations, and zoning ordinances.
See notes 100, 143-47 infra.
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wold and its notions of family privacy are not yet settled3 5 its prohibi-
tion of sweeping and excessive curtailment of associational freedom is
clear: "[A] 'governmental purpose to control or prevent activities con-
stitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.' "36
In Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan,37 the District Court for
the Northern District of California squarely questioned whether Gris-
wold's guarantee of family privacy extended to "alternate," voluntary
families.8s Although acknowledging the right of individuals to engage in
concerted action to achieve political or social goals,89 the court never-
35 The privacy concept of Griswold has recently been extended far beyond the marital
relationship. See City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1,
466 P.2d 225 (1970) (statute compelling public officials to disclose financial interests not
related to their official duties violates right of privacy); People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954,
80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 458 P.2d 194 (1967), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970) (fundamental right
of women to choose whether or not to bear children falls within the scope of privacy
related to marriage, the family, and sex).
Perhaps the most significant extension of Griswold is the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). In that case the Court, relying chiefly
on the equal protection clause, extended Griswold's right of privacy to unmarried as well
as married individuals:
If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons
cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be
equally impermissible. It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question
inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent
entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals
each with a separate intellectual and emotional make-up. If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting
a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
Id. at 453 (emphasis in original). This type of rationale questions the very foundation of
ordinances which support associational recognition solely on the basis of the blood
relation classification. It is dear that associational recognition now goes beyond the marital
relationship in the area of privacy.
36 881 U.S. 479, 485 (1965), quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 US.
288, 307 (1964). See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV.
L. REy. 844 (1970).
37 321 F. Supp. 908 (ND. Cal. 1970). Plaintiffs sued on behalf of themselves and all
other groups of more than four unrelated persons who, contrary to the terms of the
Palo Alto zoning ordinance, inhabited dwellings in R-1 neighborhoods and lived "together
as families, treating themselves and treated by others as family units." Id. at 909. They
sought to enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance on the grounds that the right of un-
related persons to live together "as a family" in a single dwelling place is an "emanation"
of the freedom of association specifically guaranteed by the Bin of Rights. Id. at 910.
38 Id. at 911-12. For an excellent and systematic treatment of the rights of "voluntary"
communal families, see Comment, All in the "Family": Legal Problems of Communes, 7
HARv. Civ. sonTrs-Civ. LiB. L. REv. 893 (1972). The constitutional arguments for the
recognition of voluntary families are discussed id. at 396416.
39 321 F. Supp. at 911. The district court described freedom of association as "the
19721
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theless upheld the exclusion of a communal group under an ordinance
limiting "family" to "one person living alone, or two or more persons
related by blood, marriage, or legal adoption, or a group not exceeding
four persons living as a single housekeeping unit."40
This court's narrow interpretation of the applicable scope of as-
sociational freedom is subject to critical analysis on several grounds.41
Its dictum that there are many long recognized values in the blood
related family which are absent in the "voluntary family" of communal
living groups42 is extremely controversial. The court stated:
The traditional family is an institution reinforced by biological
and legal ties which are difficult, or impossible, to sunder. It plays
a role in educating and nourishing the young which . .. is often
compulsory.... [I]t has been a means, for uncounted millenia,
of satisfying the deepest emotional and physical needs of human
beings.48
right to marry and raise children; to worship God--or not to worship Him-in or out
of religious congregation; and to engage in concerted action to achieve political or sodal
goals." Id.
40 Id. at 909 (Palo Alto, Cal., Munic. Code § 18.04.210).
41 The admission of religious communes and associations into suburban "R-1" areas
is an already well established "exception." In Boston-Edison Protective Ass'n v. Paulist
Fathers, Inc., 306 Mich. 253, 10 N.W.2d 847 (1943), the Michigan Supreme Court deter-
mined that priests and servants living together were a "family" in the context of a
negative reciprocal covenant. Accord, Missionaries v. Village of Whitefish Bay, 267 Wis.
609, 66 N.W.2d 627 (1954). But see Simons v. Work of God Corp., 36 11. App. 2d 199,
183 N.E.2d 729 (1962). Some municipalities make specific exceptions for religions orders
in zoning ordinances. See, e.g., City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 84 IIl. 2d 432, 435-36,
216 N.E,2d 116, 118 (1966) (Des Plaines, Ill.), Zoning Ordinance; Kirsch Holding Co. v.
Borough of Manasquan, 59 NJ. 241, 247, 281 A.2d 513, 516 (1970) (Belmar, NJ., Zoning
Ordinance §§ 19-2.83, 19-3.4).
A second ground for disagreement with the court in Palo Alto Tenants Union may
be found in its application of pertinent associational criteria as promulgated by the Su-
preme Court. In rejecting the freedom of association argument, the district court applied
its own standards, stating that the fluctuating membership of a commune is without
"legal obligations of support or cohabitation." 321 F. Supp. at 911. Neither of these
factors has been identified as an essential prerequisite to constitutional associational recog-
nition by the Supreme Court. The Court has weighed freedom of expression and asso-
ciation against a number of factors, including (1) national security (United States v. Robel,
889 U.S. 258 (1967)), (2) the administration of justice (Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 875
(1962)), (3) the preservation of local law and order (Kunz v. New York, 840 U.S. 290 (1951)),
(4) deference to an individual state's policy (Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S.
284 (1957)), (5) the right of privacy (Time, Inc. v. Hill, 885 US. 374 (1967)), and (6)
standards of decency and morality (Ginzburg v. United States, 883 U.S. 463 (1966)). The
absence of formal stability in membership and of legal obligations found in the traditional
blood related family would not seem to merit status as a competing factor capable of
offsetting recognition of associational rights.
42 321 F. Supp. at 911. Both the court and, apparently, the plaintiffs dwelt less on the
breadth of first amendment associational rights than on a qualitative comparison of
the traditional family and the commune. Id.
43 Id.
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A more penetrating examination of alternate living arrangements
reveals that they do not merit such summary rejection. The commune,
for instance, is potentially capable of fulfilling each of the familial
functions identified by the court. Communal living may feasibly re-
store some of the family's importance as an economic unit;44 serve as a
total life experience for the perpetuation of religious values;45 develop
alternative methods of child care and educational innovations;46 im-
plement equality of the sexes; 47 and provide a framework for the emo-
tional fulfillment of its members and a viable alternative social
experience in an urbanized, competitive society.48 Moreover, perhaps
the greatest value of the commune to our society is its creation of a
useful social workshop, an experiment promoting reevaluation and
improvement of the traditional family.4 9
44 The true commune is typified by common ownership of property with economic
success dependent upon a common effort of all members in the larger extended "family."
See R. HINE, C LFoRNsA's UTOPIAN COLONIES 6 (1953). In 1874 the wealth of established
communes in the United States was estimated at $12,000,000. C. NORDHOFF, THE CO-mu-
mSTc Socm s OF THE UNITED STATES 386 (1875). But wealth is neither a goal nor a
premise of today's rural communal movement which espouses a rejection of the "cash
nexus" between people and seeks sharing and self-sufficiency of the communal group as
a goal. See generally W. IEDGEnsT, THE ALTERNATIvE (1970).
45 Traditionally, religion has played a major role in the development of the alter-
native communal family. See P. INE, supra note 44, at 5. See also W. HEDGEPET, supra
note 44, at 28, for an indication of the importance of "religion" to the cohesiveness of
the less stable urban commune.
46 An example is the experience of the Israeli kibbutz. See M. SPIRO, CHILDREN OF
THE KIBBUTZ 3-24, 281-315 (1958).
The Kibbutz is a child-oriented community, par excellence. In observing
parental behavior, and from interviews with them, one cannot escape the con-
clusion that children are prized above all else, and that no sacrifice is too great to
make for them.
Id. at 49. Education in the kibbutz is collective, with children living in nurseries from the
age of four or five days, organized into small peer groups, and raised by teachers rather
than their parents. Id. at 8-9. See also CHILDREN IN COLLECTIVES: CHILDREAING AimS AND
PRACTICES IN TE KIBBUTz xv-xvi, 4, 148, 317 (P. Neubauer ed. 1965).
47 See W. HEDGEPETH, supra note 44, at 185; cf. CHILDREN IN COLLECTIns, supra note
46, at 4; M. SPIRO, supra note 46, at 6-7, 16.
48 See G. HILLERY, COMMUNAL ORGANIZATIONS: A STUDY OF LOCAL SocamiEs 122-23,
287-88 (1968). Although Hillery recognizes only a minimal disorganization of the tradi-
tional family in cities (limited chiefly to a stripping away of its nonessential elements),
he sees the "extended family," a communal-type larger organization, as a more effective
device for rendering mutual aid in the city of today. Id. See also W. HEDGPETH, supra
note 44, at 122.
Another authority has promulgated the idea of small "intentional communities" on
the model of utopian colonies as a total approach toward obtaining a superior human
environment. See P. MARKS, A NEv COMMUNITY-FORMAT FOR HEALTH, CoNTENTMENT,
SEcURIT 25-75 (1969).
49 See generally Tim FAmmy AND CHANGE (J. Edwards ed. 1969) for varied discussions
of the directions in the evolution of family life and delineations of the current pressures
on the family. The demands for recognition of more flexible life styles are made obvious
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The voluntary family is only one of many potential living arrange-
ments composed of unrelated individuals. An analysis of other groups
possessing far fewer associational qualities than the commune indicates
that the Palo Alto rationale cannot be considered determinative of the
issue. In City of Des Plaines v. Trottner50 the Illinois Supreme Court
invalidated a zoning ordinance similar to that involved in Palo AltoY1
Utilizing first amendment considerations, the court concluded that
protection of associational rights proscribes both the methodology used
by the Palo Alto court and the enforcement of that form of municipal
regulation. 2 Zoning ordinances which "penetrate so deeply.., into
the internal composition of a single housekeeping unit"53 were held
to be overextensions of the police power.
Citing Trottner with approval, the New Jersey Supreme Court
decisively rejected the single family blood relation criterion in Kirsch
by social reality. "Trial marriages," for example, have become increasingly popular; a
large number of the young are seeking out personal relationships beyond the scope of
present legal cognizance. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1972, at 38, col. 1.
Although many communes will possess only a few of the ideal qualities mentioned
(see text accompanying notes 44-48 supra), this type of comparative analysis dealing in
"potentials" is precisely that used by the Palo Alto Tenants Union court in lauding the
traditional family. Federal District Court Judge Wollenberg entered into an openly socio-
logical evaluation in his conclusory discussion of the traditional family and communes:
The traditional family is an institution reinforced by biological and legal ties
which are difficult, or impossible, to sunder. It plays a role in educating and
nourishing the young which, far from being "voluntary", is often compulsory....
[On the other hand,] communal living groups represented by plaintiffs share
few of the above characteristics. They are voluntary, with fluctuating member-
ships who have no legal obligations of support or cohabitation. They are in no
way subject to the State's vast body of domestic relations law. They do not have
the biological links which characterize most families. Emotional ties between
members may exist, but this is true of members of many groups. . . . [T]he
communes they have formed are legally indistinguishable from such traditional
living groups as religious communities and residence dubs.
321 F. Supp. at 911.
50 34 Ill. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1970).
51 The invalidated zoning ordinance defined "family" as consisting of
one or more persons each related to the other by blood (or adoption or marriage),
together with such relatives' respective spouses, who are living together in a single
dwelling and maintaining a common household. A "family" includes any domestic
servants and not more than one gratuitous guest residing with said "family".
Id. at 433-34, 216 N.E.2d at 117 (Des Plaines, Ill., Zoning Ordinance). Compare text
accompanying note 40 supra. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the right of four un-
related young men to live together as a single housekeeping unit. Id. at 437-38, 216
N.E.2d at 119-20.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 438, 216 N.E.2d at 120. The Illinois Supreme Court specifically condemned
the municipal usurpation of undelegated power in the absence of appropriate state
enabling legislation. Id.
[Vol. 58:18
UNRELATED INDIVIDUALS & ZONING
Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan.4 Whereas Trottner dealt with
unrelated individuals residing together for strictly economic purposes,5 5
Kirsch considered various resort rental situations. 6 Neither factual set-
ting possessed the obvious associational characteristics of the communal
family. Nevertheless, both decisions emphasized the privacy of the "sin-
gle housekeeping unit"57 as a separate and distinct associational entity,
the parameters of which go far beyond the limits of the consanguineous
family. The New Jersey approach stresses the emerging right of "unre-
lated people in reasonable number to have recourse to common house-
keeping facilities in circumstances free of detriment to the general
health, safety, and welfare.'
58
Such sweeping authority protecting living arrangements with only
tenuous associational interests would seem to imply that freedom of
association might altogether preclude the use of blood relation stan-
dards in municipal zoning.59 Although the force of these holdings lends
54 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971). Justice Hall, writing the opinion of the court,
struck down the ordinances of Belmar and Manasquan, New Jersey. The Belmar ordinance
defined a family as:
a. One or more persons related by blood or marriage occupying a dwelling
unit and living as a single, nonprofit housekeeping unit.
b. A collective number of individuals living together in one house under
one head, whose relationship is of a permanent and distinct domestic character,
and cooking as a single housekeeping unit. This definition shall not include any
society, dub, fraternity, sorority, association, lodge, combine, federation, group,
coterie, or organization, which is not a recognized religious order, nor include a
group of individuals whose association is temporary and resort-seasonal in char-
acter or nature.
Id. at 247, 281 A.2d at 516 (Belmar, N.J., Zoning Ordinance § 19-2.33). The Manasquan
and Belmar ordinances were identical except for the former's inclusion of maids, servants,
and employees as members of the "family." Id.
The court also cited Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 NJ.
Super. 341, 271 A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1970), with approval. In that case the Margate City
ordinance defined a single family as "one or more persons related by blood, marriage
or adoption or not more than two unrelated persons occupying a dwelling unit as a single
non-profit housekeeping unit." Id. at 842, 271 A.2d at 430 (Margate City, NJ., Zoning
Ordinance).
55 See notes 50-53 and accompanying text supra.
56 See notes 14 & 54 supra.
57 Cf. notes 64, 132 & 136 and accompanying text infra.
58 Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 N.J. Super, 341, 349, 271 A.2d
430, 484 (App. Div. 1970).
59 Both the Kirsch and Trottner holdings are phrased in broad constitutional terms,
although the limits of such application await delineation. The Kirsch decision has already
begun to take effect in New Jersey. In J.D. Constr. Corp. v. Board of Adjustment, 119 N.J.
Super. 140, 290 A.2d 452 (Law Div. 1972), the court invalidated an ordinance that limited
the number of apartment units to not more than 15% of the total number of single family
residences. The court found that the ordinance "dearly does not fulfill any of the purposes
of zoning.., and fails to set forth sufficient standards to govern its application." Id. at
150, 290 A.2d at 458. The California District Court of Appeals, however, in Brady v.
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itself to a general invalidation of single family ordinances because of
unconstitutional overbreadth or vagueness, 60 such a result would create
chaos in the area of municipal zoning by leaving to legislatures the
task of reenacting more acceptable ordinances, without providing com-
prehensive guidelines.6 Supreme Court language protecting the right
"to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas"8 2
scarcely provides a definitive test and reflects the lack of judicial cer-
tainty concerning the limits of protected private association. 3 Simi-
larly, the judiciary has not yet promulgated specific criteria to define
the proposed new "single housekeeping unit."64 Standards other than
blood relation traditionally used in defining "family," coupled with
the historically protected interests of zoning such as the welfare of
children, 5 may often be helpful in a case by case analysis. But the
broader effect of the Trottner and Kirsch decisions remains undiluted;
by protecting living arrangements with minimal associational contacts
between members and by emphasizing the right of unrelated individ-
uals to reside together, they have contributed to a growing argument
for flexibility in, and corresponding legislative reform of, single family
suburban zoning.
Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1st Dist. 1962), chose to sidestep
the dilemma created by numerous single family zoning ordinances in its jurisdiction by
reinterpreting "family."
60 The courts in both Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 N.J.
Super. 341, 271 A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1970), and Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manas-
quan, 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971), used the "unconstitutionally overbroad" technique
within a due process context to invalidate single family ordinances. Cf. NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963): "Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to
survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity." See also Coates
v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Note, Less Drastic
Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
61 Cf. Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process-Zoning-Suburban Township Ordi-
nance Which Does Not Provide for Apartments as Permissible Residential Use Violates
Due Process, 23 ALA. L. REv. 157, 167 (1970), criticizing the piecemeal judicial approach to
the zoning problem.
62 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
63 See notes 30-31 and accompanying text supra.
64 In City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 Ill. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966), the house-
keeping unit was composed of four young unrelated men, who had rented the premises for
one year. Other than holding that ordinances which "penetrate so deeply" into the compo-
sition of the single housekeeping unit were not authorized by the state enabling legislation
(id. at 438, 216 NXE.2d at 120), the Illinois Supreme Court provided few definitional clues.
There are, however, obvious outer limits to even so vague a test. The weight of authority
rejects the argument that fraternities, sororities, and other social clubs deserve associational
recognition as a family. See Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 921 (1969).
65 See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391, 394 (1926).
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B. Single Family Zoning and Equal Protection
Although single family zoning ordinances place no limit on the
number of blood related individuals able to live in a single family
residence, they generally either prohibit groups of unrelated indi-
viduals from living in the same area or set a strict numerical ceiling on
such living arrangements.66 The same courts that have grappled with
the first amendment implications of R-1 zoning have also realized that
this discrimination, without further justification, inherently conflicts
with the equal protection of the laws.67
The basic equal protection test demands that an ordinance bear
a reasonable relation to a legitimate governmental objective to justify
the classification which it has created.68 The Trottner, Kirsch, and Palo
Alto Tenants Union courts confronted ordinances which prima facie
prejudiced unrelated potential residents while favoring members of
traditional single family units.69 Although reaching different results in
assessing the validity of this classification, 70 all evaluated the effects of
the municipal legislation in the context of its relation, or lack thereof,
to a legitimate governmental objective.7 1
A stricter test of equal protection has also evolved: if the classifi-
66 See, e.g., notes 13, 51 & 54 supra. See also Brady v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App.
2d 69, 80 n.3, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242, 249 n.3 (1st Dist. 1962) for a survey of California zoning
ordinances.
67 See notes 86-88 and accompanying text infra; cf. text accompanying notes 75-77
infra.
68 See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S.
483 (1955); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940). See also Note, Low-Income Housing and
the Equal Protection Clause, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 343 (1971); Note, Constitutional Law-
Equal Protection-Zoning-Snob Zoning: Must a Man's Home Be a Castle?, 69 MIcH. L.
REv. 339 (1970).
There is, of course, a strong presumption in favor of the ordinance's validity. "A statu-
tory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) (emphasis added); see Dan-
dridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1970).
69 See notes 13, 51 & 54 supra.
70 In Trottner, the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated the ordinance as an over-
extension of local zoning power in the absence of express enabling legislation from
the Illinois General Assembly. 84 fI1. 2d at 488, 216 N.E.2d at 120. In more specific con-
stitutional terms, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Kirsch overturned the municipal ordi-
nances of Belmar and Manasquan as overly proscriptive violations of due process. 59 N.J.
at 251-52, 281 A.2d at 518. The US. District Court in Palo Alto Tenants Union, on the
other hand, sustained the validity of Palo Alto's single family ordinance. 821 F. Supp. at 912.
71 Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908, 912 (N.D. Cal. 1970); City
of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 Ill. 2d 432, 437, 216 NE.2d 116, 119 (1966); Kirsch Holding
Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 251, 281 A.2d 513, 518 (1970).
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cation is "suspect" on its face,72 or violates a fundamental interest,73 the
statute must be supported by the demonstration of a compelling state
interest.74 Judicial orientation has leaned increasingly towards exam-
ining the effect rather than the possibly permissible legislative intent
of questioned ordinances. 75 The Supreme Court has applied the com-
pelling state interest test to de facto economic classifications,76 and at
least one jurisdiction has moved in the direction of overt application
of equal protection to the economic aspects of exclusionary zoning.
77
The exclusionary effects of blood related zoning are patent. Its
blanket prohibition encompasses a wide variety of innocuous property
uses by unrelated individuals78 and ignores both regional housing
needs and adverse economic implications affecting both property
owners79 and potential users.8 0 This indiscriminate elimination of an
entire spectrum of living arrangements provided both the Illinois and
72 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 US. 1, 9 (1967) (miscegenation statute's racial orien-
tation was prima fade "suspect").
78 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 894 US. 618, 688 (1969) (the right to travel).
74 See Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. Rnv. 767, 767-80 (1969), for a characterization of the traditional doc-
trine of equal protection (rationality as the test of the validity of the legislation) as the
"older" test with the compelling state interest criterion used as the "newer" test.
75 See Note, supra note 68, 56 CoRELL L. REv. at 351-52.
76 The equal protection clause has been applied to strike down the imprisonment of
indigents to work off fines (Williams v. Illinois, 899 US. 285 (1970)), transcript fees as a
prerequisite to appeal (Griffin v. Illinois, 351 US. 12 (1956)), and poll taxes (Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 668 (1966)). See Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal
Protection, Due Process Standards, and the Indigent's Right of Free Access to the Courts,
56 IowA L. REv. 223 (1970). Dut see note 92 infra.
77 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has gone far in recognizing the economic aspects
of regional housing needs. See Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); National
Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
While these cases were decided on due process grounds, the consideration of regional needs
in both lends support to an equal protection analysis-the needs of residents of a munici-
pality balanced against the needs of less wealthy non-residents. See note 80 and accom-
panying text infra. See also Aloi & Goldberg, Racial and Economic Exclusionary Zoning:
The Beginning of the End?, 1971 URBAN L. AN. 9, 18-21, suggesting that both Nor-
walk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968), and Southern
Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970), reveal
a judicial recognition of the sodo-economic equal protection aspects of urban renewal and
zoning. But see James v. Valtierra, 402 US. 137 (1971); note 92 infra.
78 See, e.g., Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 248-49, 281
A.2d 513, 517 (1971).
79 See notes 105-10 and accompanying text infra.
8o Suburban land values have in some cases increased at a rate of fifteen percent
a year. Inevitably the price of suburban land escapes the capacity of the lower
orders to purchase it, because in no event is their purchasing power increasing at
the same scale . . . [T]his escalation of land values must in and of itself price
more and more people out of the market.
Roberts, supra note 1, at 41 (footnotes omitted).
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New Jersey Supreme Courts with grounds for holding such ordinances
unconstitutionally overbroad."' As a standard, "single family, blood
related" markedly fails to provide the precise guidelines necessary to
differentiate harmful from permissible associational uses.82
Against these observations, single family zoning may arguably
effect positive results by ostensibly propagating and protecting the
traditional family as a social unit.83 Yet this speculative accomplish-
ment is constitutionally unimportant in the absence of a showing that
reasonable uses by unrelated individuals not inimical to the "general
welfare" would threaten the traditional family, or that the blood
relation standard itself bears an intrinsic relation to governmental
objectives sufficient to overcome its exclusionary effects. While this
question merits fuller discussion in a due process context, 4 it is signi-
ficant that the courts in both Kirsch and Trottner consider legitimate
uses by unrelated individuals compatible with the residential future
of the traditional family.85
A comprehensive range of first amendment associational interests,
81 The Trottner decision was phrased in terms of the unreasonable "penetration" into
individual living arrangements, which, if within the scope of municipal power, would
"generate severe constitutional questions." 34 m11. 2d at 438, 216 N.E.2d at 120. The New
Jersey Supreme Court in Kirsch emphasized the sweeping excessiveness of the ordinance,
which, in light of its explicit prohibitory sections, "became at least ambiguous and prob-
ably inconsistent." 59 N.J. at 248-49, 281 A.2d at 517.
82 See Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 NJ. 241, 251-52, 281 A.2d
513, 518-19 (1971).
83 In Palo Alto Tenants Union, the court stressed this theme, particularly emphasiz-
ing the economic "threat" which would be posed by a more pluralistic neighborhood
policy:
Many older neighborhoods have large, once-distinguished town houses which are
not owner occupied. Often owners find it more profitable to rent these dwellings,
not to single families, but to large groups of unrelated persons with independent
sources of income. Such groups are able to pay, collectively, far more in rent than
can traditional families with one, or at best, two, wage earners. Thus the rent
structure of a whole neighborhood may be affected by opening R-1 zones to large,
unrelated living groups. As the rent and property value structure of the neighbor-
hood is changed, single families move out, and the character of the area is altered.
321 F. Supp. at 912-13. Compare notes 105-14 and accompanying text infra.
84 See notes 116-27 and accompanying text infra.
85 In Trottner, Justice Schaefer, writing for the Illinois Supreme Court, described
several such legitimate uses in his discussion of the proscriptive effects of the zoning
ordinance:
[]f the four tenants in this case were cousins, no matter how distant, or if two of
them were servants and one was a gratuitous guest, the same four individuals
could live in the same home in an identical manner. School teachers who might
choose to live together are prohibited by the ordinance from doing so, and a widow
whose grown-up children have established homes of their own can not take in a
friend who would share the expenses of the establishment ....
54 Ill. 2d at 435, 216 N.E.2d at 118. The New Jersey Supreme Court in Kirsch forcefully
used parallel examples in illustrating compatible uses. See note 14 supra.
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the expression of which is either totally proscribed or drastically limited
by the burdens of single family zoning schemes, may also submit this
form of municipal regulation to the closer scrutiny of the compelling
state interest test."6 Apparently weighing the merits of this type of single
family ordinance under the more rigid standard, the courts in Trottner
and Kirsch emphasized the equal protection consequences of such legis-
lation.8 7 Rejecting municipal arguments to the contrary,s8 both deci-
sions found no interest sufficiently compelling to overcome the ordi-
nances' deletion of an entire associational class from their respective
communities.8 9
86 "[A]ny classification which serves to penalize the exercise of [a constitutional] right,
unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconsti-
tutional." Shapiro v. Thompson, 894 U.S. 618, 634 (1968) (emphasis in original). In Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1971), the Court struck down Tennessee's durational
residence requirements for voting registration under the compelling state interest test
because of interference with both the right to vote and the right to travel.
Although many municipalities do not totally bar uses by unrelated individuals, their
preclusion from prime residential areas may have a "chilling" effect on the expression of
their first amendment associational rights. Moreover, certain alternative living arrange-
ments may qualify for constitutional first amendment recognition under either the "political,
economic, religious or cultural" criteria for public association (see NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958)) or the less specifically defined standards of
private association expressed in Griswold. See notes 31-36 supra.
87 See note 75 and accompanying text supra. In Trottner, the court used a comparative
analysis to illustrate the flaws in the municipal regulation; four cousins could live together
whereas four friends could not. 34 IIl. 2d 432, 435, 216 N.E.2d 116, 118 (1966).
In Kirsch, the court based its decision on the legislative ostracism inherent in such
ordinances, and it explicitly noted that any number of unrelated individuals, regardless of
their propriety, could not make use of the same land as an equal number of those possess-
ing the element of blood relation. 59 N.J. at 252, 281 A.2d at 518-19.
In Brady v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 72, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242, 243 (Ist Dist.
1962), the court, cognizant of the equal protection dilemma, pursued an alternative
course by interpreting the ordinance's bare term "family" in such a way as to allow un-
related individuals to live together. See note 132 infra.
88 In Trottner, the plaintiff municipality argued that single family zoning prevented
overcrowding of one-family housing and kept out transients who caused property to
depredate in value. 34 Ill. 2d at 437, 216 N.E.2d at 119.
In Kirsch, two seashore municipalities argued that such zoning was necessary to keep
out raucous groups of young adults who rented summer homes and annoyed neighbors
with "excessive noise at all hours, wild parties, intoxication, acts of immorality, lewd and
lascivious conduct and traffic and parking congestion." 59 N.J. at 245, 281 A.2d at 515.
89 Another possible "fundamental interest" which may subject single family zoning
to the more stringent test is a suggested ninth amendment right to housing derived from
Justice Goldberg's discussion of implicit rights in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
486 (1965) (concurring opinion). See Aloi & Goldberg, supra note 77, at 34-35; Sager, supra
note 74, at 790; Note, supra note 68, 69 MICH. L. REv. at 350. This argument is buttressed
by Supreme Court concern for housing, as well as racial equality, exemplified in Jones v.
Alfred Mayer Co. (392 U.S. 409 (1968)), Reitman v. Mulkey (387 U.S. 369 (1967)), and Shelley
v. Kraemer (334 U.S. 1 (1948)).
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Viewed in a wider perspective, however, the equal protection
concept is of limited importance to those who would challenge single
family zoning's criteria. Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has gravitated towards adapting equal protection to the difficult ques-
tions of zoning,90 the doctrine remains most effective in a racial context,
since the Supreme Court's decision in James v. Valtierra9l severely
inhibits the possibility of its future expansion into the economic or
social spheres.9 2 Perhaps the greatest value of the equal protection
concept is that it calls attention to the discrimination inherent in
the single family classification. A comparison of the situations of similar
individuals, who differ only in the presence or absence of blood relation
to other members of a group, reveals an anomalous regulatory pattern
in which one person has legal access to the suburban "ideal" 93 while
another is excluded because of an over-simplified criterion.
C. Single Family Zoning and Due Process
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.94 and Nectow v. City of
Cambridge95 established the due process parameters of permissible
zoning legislation: the ordinance in question must have a "foundation
in reason and [bear a] substantial relation to the public health, the
public morals, the public safety or the public welfare in its proper
90 See note 77 supra.
91 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
92 In the field of public housing, at least, the Supreme Court has apparently drawn
the equal protection line. In Valtierra, the Court, reversing the district court, held that an
article of the California constitution providing for mandatory referenda for low-cost hous-
ing did not violate the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. This decision gains
additional impetus from the Court's prior decision in Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385
(1969), holding a provision in a city charter to be an unconstitutional classification based
on race because it required that laws dealing with racial housing matters could take effect
only if they survived a mandatory referendum while other housing ordinances took effect
without any such special election. The Court distinguished Hunter by limiting it to classi-
fications placing "special burdens on racial minorities" while refusing to extend it to
economic minorities. 402 US. at 140-41. Thus, the type of interest infringed, rather than
the economic classifications involved, is now crucial.
Nevertheless, the emerging right of unrelated individuals to reside as a new entity
-the "single housekeeping unit"--may merit increased future recognition, particularly
in those jurisdictions where the regional crush of housing needs squarely confronts the
realities of single family suburbia. "It is conceivable that this [judicial] awareness [of
regional housing demands] could take the form of an extension of the close-scrutiny test
to snob-zoning laws." Note, supra note 68, 69 MIcH. L. Rlv. at 350.
93 See generally Roberts, supra note 1, for a not altogether enthusiastic look at the
"suburban bias."
94 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
95 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
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sense."9' 6 This standard, coupled with an understanding of associational
and equal protection elements in the reasonableness approach of sub-
stantive due process, has served as a useful test for the constitutionality
of single family zoning. Justice Schaefer, writing for a unanimous court
in City of Des Plaines v. Trottner,97 discussed the unreasonableness
of single family standards in light of the permissible zoning objective
of limiting intensity of land use:
Family groups are mobile today, and not all family units are in-
ternally stable and well-disciplined. Family groups with two or
more cars are not unfamiliar. And so far as intensity of use is
concerned, the definition in the present ordinance, with its refer-
ence to the "respective spouses" of persons related by blood, mar-
riage or adoption, can hardly be regarded as an effective control
upon the size of family units.98
The Illinois Supreme Court directly refutes the later argument in Palo
Alto Tenants Union that the transient qualities of unrelated groups
would adversely affect neighborhood stability.99
There are excellent policy reasons for regulation of the intensity
of land use: to avoid overcrowding and congestion; to provide open land
on residential lots; to space buildings adequately; and to prevent over-
loading of street and transit services, schools, parks, and other com-
munity facilities. 100 But while single family zoning possesses the appeal
of tradition, it lacks concrete regulatory force in an area which so
intimately affects health, safety, and general welfare.101 The American
family does have a comparatively small "average" size, 102 but the exis-
96 Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 US. 183, 187-88 (1928), quoting Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 865, 895 (1926). Although these ingredients of the due
process "reasonableness" test lack inherent specificity and consequently depend on evolving
judicial construction for their definition, they nevertheless have served as a useful frame-
work for the determination of legitimate exercises of the police power through zoning.
But the breadth of this framework subjects the due process test to almost unlimited judicial
expansion. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), for the proposition that the
"public welfare" encompasses the aesthetic aims of urban renewal, justifying the condem-
nation of a structurally sound and sanitary building to achieve a better balanced and more
attractive community after slums had been cleared.
97 84 IM. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966).
98 Id. at 438, 216 N.E.2d at 119.
99 Id. at 437-88, 216 N.E.2d at 119; see note 108 infra.
100 Criy PLANNmNG COM'N, R.EZONING Naw YORK Crry 20-21 (1959).
101 See notes 97-99 and accompanying text supra; notes 102-27 and accompanying text
infra.
102 The American "family," defined as "a group of two or more persons related by
blood, marriage, or adoption and residing together in a household" (US. DE"'T or COm-
MERCE, BURAu OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1971, at 3), has
an average size of 8.62 members. Id. at 36. Interestingly, the American "household," de-
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tence of large traditional families or even larger extended families'018
calls into question the consistency of an argument opposed to unre-
lated individuals for reasons of unit density.104
Economic considerations, often a salient factor in traditional due
process challenges to zoning,10 5 also offer evidence of the flaws in single
family regulation. Even the Palo Alto court recognized that group
rental and corresponding uses would be "far more" profitable than
renting to traditional families, and suggested further that this factor
might potentially alter the rent structure of an entire neighborhood. 106
Moreover, both the Kirsch and Trottner courts rejected the Palo Alto
hypothesis107 that rental to unrelated individuals would depreciate prop-
erty values. 08 There seems to be no valid reason why a more pluralistic
zoning approach, coupled with police power limitations on obnoxious
uses, 09 would not be economically compatible with existing single
fined to include both related families and unrelated individuals "who share the [same]
housing unit" (id. at 3), has a smaller average size of only 3.17. Id. at 86. These statistics
lend credence to the argument that property use by unrelated groups should not be
barred on the grounds of land use density.
103 The extended family is that larger group of family members who are blood re-
lated-aunts, uncles, cousins, grandparents, etc. The "blood, marriage, or adoption"
criterion, so frequently used to define "family" in municipal zoning ordinances, places no
limit on the degree or distance of blood relation.
104 The equal protection concept as used by the Trottner and Kirsch courts serves as
a ready approach to this type of comparative analysis. See note 87 and accompanying text
supra.
105 The opinion of the Supreme Court in framing the issues in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 865 (1926), illustrates the historical approach:
The suit was brought by an owner of unimproved land within the corporate limits
of the village, who sought the relief upon the ground that, because of the building
restrictions imposed, the ordinance operated to reduce the normal value of his
property, and to deprive him of liberty and property without due process of law.
Id. at 867 (syllabus by the Court). This type of argument is not in and of itself conclusive.
It is only one element in a balancing process used to determine the constitutionality of a
statute. See Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 NJ. Super. 341, 849, 271
A.2d 430, 484 (App. Div. 1970).
106 Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 821 F. Supp. 908, 912-13 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
107 Id. at 913.
108 In terms of permissible zoning objectives, a group of persons bound together
only by their common desire to operate a single housekeeping unit, might be
thought to have a transient quality that would affect adversely the stability of
the neighborhood, and so depredate the value of other property...
But none of these observations reflect a universal truth.
34 IMI. 2d at 437, 216 N.E.2d at 119.
The New Jersey Supreme Court chose to discuss the situation in terms of the "financial
bonanza" of group rental in resort areas. Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan,
59 NJ. 241, 245, 281 A.2d 513, 515 (1971).
109 See Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 253, 281 A.2d 518,
520 (1971), positing "general police power ordinances and criminal statutes" as protection
from obnoxious uses by either unrelated or related individuals.
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family uses. 1"0 Consideration of the needs of potential residents of sub-
urbia, in addition to the historically accepted analysis of the interests
of existing property owners in the community, must play an important
role in the opening of the suburbs."'.
Regional housing needs also demand increased recognition as a
major challenge confronting zoning."2 Although no court dealing with
the single family zoning issue has gone so far as the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court has in invalidating an ordinance because of its regional
exclusionary effects," 3 judicial notice has been taken of the reality of
"population expansion and ensuing land contraction."' 14 Allowing un-
related groups to occupy residential areas offers a partial response to
the problem although creating new concerns about land use density."15
110 In some areas, particularly those in which available land is scarce, the prices of
single family homes may rise with the advent of rental to unrelated persons. But to see
only this half of the problem is to neglect the obvious economic exclusionary effects of the
present scheme; at present, low and moderate income single families have been zoned out
of the already high-priced suburban market to the "benefit" of those families who can
afford homes. See note 80 supra. Concomitantly, low income unrelated groups (for example,
the aged) have been deprived of access to surburbia. See note 15 supra. The housing market
is responsive to supply and demand. Unrelated persons moving to the suburbs under a
more flexible scheme will also have to vacate present living quarters, thus presumably re-
ducing rental and purchase prices in the latter areas. Additionally, the occasional hardship
worked in some areas by higher purchase prices will be more than compensated for by an
increase in rental values stemming from the overall access of all groups to suburbia.
111 See notes 1-3, 5 supra. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has overcome serious
difficulties with standing in considering the needs of those who neither own property nor
reside in the given municipality. In both Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970),
and National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215
A.2d 597 (1965), the court consciously weighed the interests of those outside the munid-
pality. Although these interests may be relevant under a general reasonableness analysis,
they do not fit easily under the standing requirements of the narrower Euclid-Nectow
approach.
112 See notes 77-80 and accompanying text supra.
113 See note 77 and accompanying text supra. National Land & Investment emphasized
that a municipality may not refuse to accept its portion of regional expansion by zoniig
out all but the wealthy through excessive minimum lot size requirements. 419 Pa. at 528,
215 A.2d at 612. The court further noted the relevance of a consideration of "the means
of at least a significant segment of the people." Id. Girsh enlarged this judicial mandate
by requiring a multiplicity of permissible uses in municipal zoning ordinances and in-
validating a local ordinance excluding multiple unit dwellings. 437 Pa. at 243, 263 A.2d
at 398.
Although these cases involved total exclusion of certain uses by a municipality, it may
well be that overly large single family residential districts are themselves forbidden by a
logical extension of these holdings. Rising land costs, the devotion of large amounts of land
to R-l uses, and the proscriptive effect of the single family residential classification all
tend to bring the R-I rubric within the forbidden exclusionary ambit of these cases. See
notes 2-16 and accompanying text supra.
114 Brady v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 82, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242, 250 (1st Dist.
1962).
115 Cf. notes 100-04 and accompanying text supra.
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Against these overt defects in the characterization of single family
zoning as a "permissible exercise" of the police power, the municipal-
ity's interest must also be weighed. It may be argued that the single
family as a fundamental social unit bears an intimate relation to the
public health, safety, morals, and general welfare.116 Analysis of the
"family" employed as a criterion in municipal zoning regulation reveals,
however, that such is not the case. Although reasonable limitations on
both the amount and kind of land use are legitimate goals of the exer-
cise of police power,11 7 single family zoning has failed to realize these
positive aims.118 Similarly, the suggestion that this type of ordinance is
intimately linked to the preservation of public morals is without justi-
fiable foundation. Although the single family is utilized in the social-
ization process to propagate certain ethical and cultural mores, 19 there
is no evidence that reasonable incorporation of unrelated individuals
into the residential scheme would threaten this process. If a nuisance
situation does arise, vigorous enforcement of carefully circumscribed
general police power ordinances constitutes a far more potent control
mechanism than does single family zoning. "The practical difficulty of
applying land use regulation to prevent the evil is found in the
seeming inability to define the offending groups precisely enough so
as not to include innocuous groups within the prohibition.' ' 20
The preservation of the single family is unquestionably conceptu-
ally related to "the general welfare."'12 However, there is no sug-
116 This was the position postulated by the court in Palo Alto Tenants Union v.
Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908, 911 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
117 See, e.g., Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 169-70, 89 A.2d
693, 695 (1952); Nolden v. East Cleveland City Comm'n, 12 Ohio Misc. 205, 232 N.E.2d 421
(C.P. 1966).
118 See notes 98, 100-04 and accompanying text supra.
119 See generally M. MEAD & K. HEYMAN, THE FAMLY (1965).
As far back as our knowledge takes us, human beings have lived in families.
We know of no period when this was not so. We know of no people who have
succeeded for long in dissolving the family or displacing it. Instead, men have
exercised their imagination in the elaboration of different styles of family living
and different ways of relating the family to the larger community.
Id. at 77.
120 Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 253, 281 A.2d 513, 519
(1971).
121 In Griswold, Justice Douglas pointedly discussed the right to marry and to have
or to refrain from having children:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than our
political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for
better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being
sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior deci-
sions.
381 U.S. at 486.
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gestion that the protection of this unit could not be achieved in a
multi-use atmosphere and by less restrictive, but more precise, means of
regulation.2 2 A number of interests crucial to the general welfare have
in fact been prejudiced by single family exclusionary zoning: regional
housing needs are often ignored; 23 innocent land use by unrelated per-
sons is frequently prohibited; m  and economic interests of both owners
and potential users of land are adversely affected.125 In many instances
the single family blood relation classification simply shifts general wel-
fare problems from the hinterland into the cities with the result that
comprehensive solutions are barred by the rigidity of the suburban
zoning pattern.120 The question must be raised "whether... it is the
public welfare which is being benefited or whether, disguised as legis-
lation for the public welfare, a zoning ordinance actually serves purely
private interests." 127 The cumulative force of associational, equal pro-
tection, and due process reasoning demands an urgent search for alter-
natives to the dominance of single family zoning in suburbia.
122 See notes 139-49 and accompanying text infra.
123 See notes 77-79, 112-14 and accompanying text supra.
[I]ntransigent administrators have created an unresponsive body of remedial
zoning law and have erected an impenetrable exclusionary wall based upon race
and economic class. These conditions might have gone unheeded but for the
problems of the inner cities--the population explosion, the housing shortage, the
increasing economic mobility of minority groups and today's "tight money" condi-
tion whereby housing starts are at their lowest levels since 1966.
Aloi & Goldberg, supra note 77, at 11-12 (footnotes omitted). The problem cannot be un-
derstood through piecemeal analysis since today's housing crisis is a comprehensive phe-
nomenon. See generally FORD FOUNDATION, A DECENT PLACE To IavE (1971).
124 See notes 14, 50-58 and accompanying text supra.
125 See notes 105-14 and accompanying text supra.
126 [N]o matter how extensive the rebuilding of our central cities [is], a major
share of new housing, including housing for low-income families, will have to be
developed in outlying areas. There is also a growing awareness that, in these out-
lying areas, constraints in the form of land use regulation are often employed-
sometimes intentionally-to prevent sites from being used for low income housing.
The power to exclude is in the hands of local officials. The challenge to the fed-
eral government is to use federal programs to assist in widening the range of
choices without resorting to federal control of land.
This challenge entails resolving two objections advanced by localities: (a)
that the admission of lower-income families results in a net financial loss to the
locality; and (b) that the acceptance of lower-income families would inevitably
lead to social disruption.
PRESWENT'S TASK FORCE ON Low INCOME HousING, REPORT: TowARD Bn-a HOUSING FOR
Low INcOME FAMILIEs 4 (1970). See generally NATIONAL ADvIsORY COMMIssION ON CIr.
Disoanms, REPORT (1968).
127 National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504,
530, 215 A.2d 597, 611 (1965) (emphasis in original). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court sup-
plied its answer: "A zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance
of newcomers in order to avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise, upon the admin-
istration of public services and facilities can not be held valid." Id. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612.
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CONCLUSION
The single family zoning ordinance is the most formidable obstacle
limiting access of unrelated persons to suburbia.128 While judicial ex-
amination of this problem is still in its embryonic stages, the viability
of the single family blood relation ordinance as a practical standard is
open to serious question in light of regional approaches to zoning 9 and
a severe national housing crisis.'3
Alternatives do exist. Faced with a plethora of single family zoning
ordinances within its jurisdiction, the California Court of Appeals, in
Brady v. Superior Court,131 elected to confine its solution to the existing
structure, interpreting the term "family" to encompass widely varied
uses by unrelated individuals. 32 This approach, although desirable
from the standpoint of working minimal havoc on the present statutory
scheme, is only possible with ordinances employing the term "family"
without further legislative definition. 3 3 The Illinois Supreme Court
128 See generally Aloi & Goldberg, supra note 77, at 11; Williams & Norman,
supra note 2, at 481.
129 A number of jurisdictions are progressing toward a regional land use outlook and
have assumed a more comprehensive stance in regulatory controls. See HAWAn REV. STAT.
§ 205-2 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 6251-85 (McKinney Supp. 1972); P.R. LAws
ANN. tit. 23, §§ 311-311s (1964). See also Roberts, supra note 1, at 36-49.
130 See notes 7, 123 & 126 and accompanying text supra.
31 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242 (Ist Dist. 1962).
182 The court observed:
While we recognize the importance of zoned and planned community development
in this day of population expansion and ensuing land contraction, Atherton, de-
spite an opportunity for clarity, has enacted an ordinance of ambiguity. It has left
to the courts the task of attempting to fill in the content, an undertaking which
may be better discharged by the legislative rather than judicial branch of the gov-
ernment.
Id. at 82, 19 Cal. Rptr. at 250. As to the ordinance in question, however, the court stated:
We must interpret the words of the ordinance in their strict sense because, al-
though Atherton could have endowed them with restrictive or wide coverage, it
did not do so; we can attach to them only their bare meaning. "Single family
dwelling" must mean, in our judgment, an individual or a group of persons living
on the premises as a single housekeeping unit.
Id. at 77, 19 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
133 For example, the Atherton, California, zoning regulations provided: "In one
family residential districts 'A,' 'B' and 'C' no lot or parcel of land, building, structure, or
improvement shall be used, and no building, structure or improvement shall be hereafter
erected, constructed, structurally altered or enlarged, except for a single family dwelling
and accessory buildings thereto." Brady v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 71, 19 Cal.
Rptr. 242, 243 (1st Dist. 1962) (Atherton, Cal., Ordinance 146, § 3-1). A "one-family dwell-
ing" was defined as "[a] detached building designed for or occupied exclusively by one
family." Id. (§ 22-5).
The municipality assumed both a naive and circular approach in enacting such regu-
lations. Even a cursory precedential evaluation would have indicated the wide disparity in
definitions of "family" (see, e.g., notes 2, 12 & 13 supra) and that regulating dwellings,
rather than numbers, bears no relation to land use intensity. In effect, the Atherton ap-
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has taken another path: invalidation of a zoning regulation on consti-
tutional or other grounds, such as insufficiently broad enabling legis-
lation, leaving to the municipality the task of enacting a less obnoxious
ordinance. 34 Unfortunately, this approach, although pointedly indi-
cating the defects of single family zoning, is too piecemeal to constitute
a total solution.13 5 Alternatively, the New Jersey Superior Court has
recommended the criterion of the "single housekeeping unit" as a
legislative substitute for the "single family" in zoning.3 6 Although
such a standard might well succeed in curtailing difficulties in the
narrow confines of a resort rental conflict in New Jersey,13 7 it bears with
it concomitant imprecision and the inability to limit the intensity of
land use.
38
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Kirsch has, however, suggested
certain eminently reasonable alternatives:
[C]onsideration might quite properly be given to zoning or housing
code provisions, which would have to be of general application,
limiting the number of occupants in reasonable relation to avail-
able sleeping and bathroom facilities or requiring a minimum
amount of habitable floor area per occupant.13 9
Regulating the intensity of land use by restricting the number of indi-
viduals allowed to occupy a given land area is not the entire answer.
However, the continued existence of large traditional blood related
families, which would undoubtedly be protected by the legislature,
proach is to zone by buildings, to define buildings in terms of "family," and to leave
"family" undefined.
'34 City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 III. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966).
135 See Roberts, supra note 1, at 37; Comment, Exclusionary Zoning: A Legislative
Approach, 22 SYRACuSE L. REv. 583 (1971); Note, supra note 61, at 167.
136 Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 N.J. Super. 341, 350, 271
A.2d 430, 435 (App. Div. 1970). Whereas the court in Brady employed the "single house-
keeping unit" as a matter of statutory construction to uphold the ordinance in question
(see note 132 supra), the Gabe Collins court invalidated a single family ordinance and
proposed the single housekeeping unit as a matter of legislative reform.
137 See Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 N.J. Super. 341, 343-45,
271 A.2d 430, 431-32 (App. Div. 1970); cf. Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan,
59 N.J. 241, 243-45, 281 A.2d 513, 514-15 (1971).
138 The same type of definitional problems would persist in the "single housekeeping
unit" as are now present in the term "family." Such a unit would similarly fail to regulate
the intensity of land use. Note, however, that the unrelated "household," as a practical
matter, has a smaller average size than does its blood related counterpart. See note 102
supra. Gabe Collins posits a good argument for legislative revision of zoning definitions
of "family," which would allow more precise expansion to a "single housekeeping unit."
See note 136 and accompanying text supra. See also Town of Ithaca v. Lucente, 36
App. Div. 2d 560, 317 N.Y.S.2d 679 (3d Dep't 1971).
139 59 NJ. at 254, 281 A.2d at 520.
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would require expansive numerical limits which could open the sub-
urban door to multiple dwellings140 with rentals to varied unrelated
groups.'
4 '
The problem must ultimately be faced on two levels. In planning
for future communities, new approaches are already available. The
"new towns" stand as convincing proof that a more diversely planned
suburbia can work.142 A flexible coalition of reasonable bulk regula-
tions' 43 and "incentive," 144 "floating,"'145 and "cluster"'146 zoning tech-
140 Among those architects and planners who have a special interest in housing
costs, there has long been a widespread consensus that the most promising oppor-
tunity for good inexpensive housing is to be found in some form of multiple
dwellings. With the recent sharp rise in housing costs, this is probably even more
true nowadays.
Williams & Norman, supra note 2, at 481. See generally M. NEurzE, THE SUBURBAN APART-
MENT Boom (1968); PRESIDENT's COMM'N ON URBAN HOUSING, REPORT: UNrrED STATES Hous-
ING NEEDS 1968-1978 (1967).
141 This prospective trend might force suburban zoning into a more flexible posture
and aid in the implementation of much needed regional housing schemes. See notes 123
& 129 and accompanying text supra. See also Davidoff & Davidoff, supra note 5, at 528-31.
But see E. YONKLEY, THE LAW OF SUBDIVISIONS § 12, at 23 (1963):
The right to exercise control over the subdivision of land should properly be
placed in the hands of local planning authorities. From a planning standpoint, any
other method of exercising control over the regulation of land subdivision serves
only to hamstring the planning commission in developing ... its comprehensive
plan for community development.
142 For a description of the new town concept, see E. HowARD, GARDEN CITIEs OF To-
MoRRow 50-57 (FJ. Osborne ed. 1965). Mr. Howard's ideas, originally published in an
1898 text of this work, have met with renewed interest today as evidenced by the apparent
success of Columbia, Maryland. See G. BRECKENFELD, COLUMBIA AND THE NEw CrrITE (1971).
See also E. EicHrLR & M. KAPLAN, Tim COMMUNITY BUILDERs (1967), for a wider discussion
of the movement to create new towns as a reaction to the failure of urban development.
The new town idea seeks to unite the ideals of the city and the country into the "garden
city." In so doing, it emphasizes the needed pluralism of a multi-use scheme, with jobs
and all types of living accommodations united in a planned environment.
143 "Bulk regulations" govern the size (including height and floor area) of buildings,
lot size, the number of residential units, the shape of structures, the relation of exterior
walls of buildings to lot lines or to other buildings, and the relation of buildings to open
areas. See CnIY PLANNING COMM'N, PROPOSED COMPREHENSIVE AMENDMENT OF THE
ZONING RESOLUTION OF THE Crry OF NEW YoRK 20 (1959). For a comprehensive look at bulk
regulation controls, see CrTY PLANNING COMM'N, REZONING NEw YORK CrTY 20-37 (1959).
Compare Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 NJ. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952)
(minimum floor space requirements necessary to protect the character of the community
are reasonable within a broadly construed "general welfare'), with Medinger Appeal, 877
Pa. 217, 104 A.2d 118 (1954) (minimum floor space requirements for aesthetic and economic
reasons are not sufficiently related to health, morals, safety, or general welfare of the com-
munity).
144 Incentive zoning in New York City includes zoning by negotiation, zoning by con-
tract, zoning by design, zoning by politics, and zoning by economics. B. SPAr, A PROPOSAL
TO CHANGE THE STRUrmnuP OF Crry PLANNING 83 (1971). While its often vague criteria and
considerable delegation of discretion may be criticized, this form of regulation can, by
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niques147 would ensure in expanding communities both the continued
welfare of the traditional family and a retention of the desirable ele-
ments of suburban character.
More acute, however, are the problems of existing suburban mu-
nicipalities, particularly those in which additional land is not readily
available for multi-use growth. Here the segregation of industrial, and
possibly commercial, uses from residential ones should continue, 4 s but
with "residential uses" defined in the broadest of terms. Reasonable
bulk regulations and precisely drawn general police power ordinances
could separate desirable from obnoxious uses within a broad "resi-
dential" zoning district, while living arrangements of unrelated indi-
viduals could flourish. Thus, the regulatory impetus would shift from
what is now exclusionary zoning to more tolerant and precise schemes
of land use control.
providing rewards or a "bonus" to the developer, secure desirable results (e.g., open spaces).
Id. at 83-93.
An important technique of suburban subdivision regulation is "contribution"--re-
quiring a developer to donate land as a park, etc., as a precondition to approval of his
subdivision design. See Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673,
271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966). This is a particularly effective measure to ensure the planned
development of new communities, with approval of a developer's plan as the "incentive"
for contribution.
145 Floating zoning involves a municipal plan in which a number of use districts are
provided but are not specifically bound to the zoning map. The permissibility of a use is
considered on a "reasonable" parcel by parcel basis by the local planning board. Such a
plan implements a significant degree of flexibility in the municipal scheme. See, e.g.,
Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 802 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731, 96 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1951).
146 Cluster zoning consists of the concentration of residences in one small lot size area
and the concurrent retention of large "greenbelts" for the general use of the neighborhood
or community. For example, instead of building ten homes on ten uniform one-acre lots, a
developer may be required to "cluster" ten homes on three acres and transfer the remaining
land to an association of the ten homeowners. See E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING 6-115
to 6-116 (1971). This technique is ideal for implementing suburban growth while retaining
the open and "green" character of a community.
147 The implementation of these techniques at the suburban level may, in some in-
stances, require expanded state enabling legislation. See ADvIsORY COMMISSION ON INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL RE.ATIONS, URBAN AND RURAL AmucA: POLICIS FOR FUTURE GRowTH 107-
21, 163-72 (1968).
148 The planned separation of industrial from residential uses would seem to be more
important today in light of increased interest in environmental problems. The now classic
decision in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.YS.2d
312 (1970), illustrates the serious problems which can arise from the proximity of residen-
tial areas to industrial districts. But cf. J. JACoBs, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMIu-
CAN CITIES 143-77 (1961), suggesting that integration of business with residential uses is not
only permissible, but crucial to the survival of urban areas. See also R. BABCOCK, THE
ZONING GAME 180-33 (1966), discussing current dissatisfaction with exclusive use districts
and advocating "performance standards" as a means of controlling industry and "planned
unit development" in residential areas-the antithesis of the exclusive districting principle.
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Admittedly, the solution must be both legislative and compre-
hensive. 149 Nevertheless, the case by case judicial approach has laid the
foundation for future reform by questioning the most basic tenet of
suburban zoning and replacing it with less restrictive, more effective
means of regulation. In the words of one judicial spokesman, a perpet-
uation of the status quo would be not unlike "'burn[ing] the house
to roast the pig.' "150
James A. Smith, Jr.
149 See notes 129 & 135 and accompanying text supra.
150 Larson v. Mayor & Council, 99 N.J. Super. 365, 374, 240 A.2d 31, 36 (Law Div.
1968). The expression was subsequently used in Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate
City, 112 N.J. Super. 341, 346, 271 A.2d 430, 432 (App. Div. 1970) and later in Kirsch
Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 252, 281 A.2d 513, 519 (1971).
Pigs seem quite popular in the zoning context. In discussing the "nuisance" of inap-
propriate uses, the Supreme Court in Euclid stated, "[It] may be merely a right thing in
the wrong place,--like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, S88 (1926).
